Introduction

Safety management in construction
Considerable research has been undertaken in the construction management domain to identify the determinants of project safety performance. Contemporary models of incident causation in the construction industry recognize that incidents are caused by a complex interaction between proximal factors, including site conditions and workers behaviour, and distal factors, including the safety responses of clients, designers, managers and supervisors engaged in the oversight of construction work (Suraji et al. 2001 ). Thus, some researchers have focused upon the influence of owners/clients of the construction industry (Huang & Hinze, 2006) , as well as the designers of buildings and structures (Gambatese, et al. 2005) . Construction management researchers have also examined the influence of variables at the level of the construction firm and/or project on occupational safety performance. Overwhelmingly, objective safety performance has been linked to the quality of safety management activity in construction organizations or projects (Fang et al. 2004 , Mohammed, 1999 . Research demonstrates that managers at different levels, including senior managers and first-level supervisors, have a significant impact upon safety performance in the construction industry (Sawacha et al. 1999; Choudhry & Fang, 2008) . MacDonald et al. (2009) report a 'top down' cascading management influence on safety performance at a large university construction project in the USA, in which commitment to safety was driven by the client and transmitted through the managerial hierarchy to create a shared understanding of the importance of safety at all levels in the project. Recognition of the impact of management action (or inaction) on safety performance in the construction industry has led to an increased interest in psychological and social determinants of safety performance, in particular how people perceive and respond to their work environment (Torner & Poussette, 2009 ).
Construction workers' are believed to develop shared perceptions of the safety response of referent others, including senior managers, supervisors and co-workers (Melia et al. 2008) . Safety climate theory suggests that these perceptions are then socially transmitted to become collective values, norms and behaviours within workgroups, projects and organizations which, in turn, influence safety performance. Empirical evidence in the construction management literature supports this proposition. For example, in a large quantitative analysis utilizing structural equation modelling, Molenaar et al. (2009) identified perceptions of managers' response to safety as the most influential determinant of safety performance in construction projects. Neal and Griffin (2006: pp 946-947) define safety climate as 'individual perceptions of the policies, procedures and practices relating to safety in the workplace.' Safety climate is believed to shape workers' behavior through the expectations they form about how organizations value and reward safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005) . A great deal of interest has been given to the extent to which safety climate predicts safety performance within organizations (Cooper & Phillips 2004) . There is considerable evidence that strong and positive safety climates are linked to higher levels of safety performance. For example, Tharaldsen et al. (2008) report a significant inverse correlation between safety climate perceptions and accident rates in the offshore industry, while Mearns et al. (2003) showed that offshore installations returning a lower proportion of self-reported accidents were characterized by more favorable safety climates. Varonen and Mattila (2000) report safety climate to be inversely correlated with the accident rate in wood processing companies and, in the Australian health sector, Neal and Griffin (2006) report that safety climate measured at one point in time positively predicted subsequent safety motivation and self-reported safety-related behavior. Clarke (2006) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of safety climate research and reports a consistent positive link between safety climate and safety performance in prospective studies (i.e. those in which safety performance was monitored after the measurement of safety climate was undertaken).
Safety climate
Safety climate has also been linked to an organization's ability to appropriately attribute incident causes and learn lessons from safety incidents (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1998) .
Safety climate in construction
Safety climate has been examined in the construction industry (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991) . Consistent with research in other industries, there is empirical evidence to support a positive link between safety climate and the safety performance of construction organizations (Gillen et al., 2002) . In Hong Kong, Siu et al.(2004) measured how construction workers perceived the safety responses of themselves, their colleagues, management, company safety officers and their supervisors, reporting that aggregated safety climate scores were directly related to self-reported injury rate. Zhou et al. (2008) report that two climate dimensions (management commitment and workmates' influence) exert significantly greater influence on self-reported safety behavior than workers' personal experiences of training and safety in the Hong Kong construction context. In a lagged, two-wave study of Swedish construction workers, Poussette et al. (2008) report that safety climate scores at one point in time significantly predicted self-reported safety behaviors seven months later (after controlling for safety behavior at time one).
Group-level safety climates
The majority of safety climate studies have focused on the organization as the unit of analysis. However, Zohar (2000) proposed two levels of safety climate: (i) that arising from the formal organization-wide policies and procedures established by top management; and (ii) that arising from the safety practices associated with the implementation of company policies and procedures within workgroups. Zohar tested this proposition in a manufacturing context and confirmed that workgroup members develop a shared set of perceptions of supervisory safety practices, and discriminate between perceptions of the organization's safety climate and the workgroup safety climate. Zohar suggests that the prevailing group safety climate relates to patterns of supervisory safety practices, or ways in which organization level policies are implemented within each workgroup or sub-unit. In support of this, Johnson (2007) revealed that perceptions of supervisors' safety actions predicted safety behavior and the occurrence of incidents in the manufacturing sector.
Arguably, the group safety climate should be a stronger predictor of safety performance than organization level safety climate, especially in large organizations, because most workers have little contact with top management and are more likely to be influenced on a day-to-day basis by interactions with members of their immediate workgroup, including the supervisor and coworkers. The strength of group-level influences on safety was highlighted by a study of macro-(organizational) and micro-(group level) factors on workers' safety performance conducted by Simard and Marchand (1994) . In this research, supervisory practices were reported to be the strongest predictor of workgroups' propensity to take safety initiatives (Simard & Marchand 1995) and to comply with safety rules (Simard & Marchand 1997) . The effect of workgroup and supervisory practices were considerably higher than macro-(organizational) factors, such as top management commitment to safety espoused by organizational safety policies. Further, Simard and Marchand (1995) found that these macro-(organization-level) factors influenced workers' safety behavior indirectly via group-level safety factors. This finding is consistent with the assertion of Christian et al. (2009) that proximal antecedents of safety performance will have a stronger influence than distal antecedents. 
The importance of first level supervisors
Aim
The present research aimed to quantitatively evaluate the role played by first level supervisors in shaping the safety performance of workgroups in the Australian construction supply chain. Specific research objectives were:
 to measure multiple levels of safety climate in a sample of Australian construction workers;
 to explore the relationship between safety climate perceptions and injury frequency rates; and  to examine whether the relationship between perceptions of the organizational safety climate and injury frequency rate is mediated by the group-level safety climate.
Mediator variables explain how or why a predictor variable influences an outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986 ). Thus, group-level safety climate is viewed as a mechanism through which the organizational safety climate influences injury frequency rates. Figure 1 depicts the hypothesis that group safety climate mediates the relationship between the organizational safety climate and injury frequency rates.
The question of whether the relationship between organization-level safety climate and workgroup safety performance is mediated by group level safety climate perceptions is important for both safety management theory and practice. On a theoretical level, testing the mediation hypothesis provides more precise understanding of the mechanism of managerial influence within organizations. Latane´ (1981) On a practical level, evidence of a mediation effect would also have implications for the design of safety management interventions within organizations because it would suggest that the demonstration of safety commitment by senior managers will not, by itself, have a substantial impact upon workgroup safety performance. Full or partial mediation would suggest that first level supervisors must also respond positively to safety in order to achieve good safety outcomes within workgroups. Injury frequency rate
Research methods
Data collection
The survey was designed to measure three aspects of safety climate: (i) perceptions of the organizational safety response; (ii) perceptions of supervisors' safety response and (iii) perceptions of coworkers' safety response. This is consistent with Melia et al. (2008) who suggest that safety climate should be analysed from the point of view of the agent that performs or is responsible for specific safety activities within organizations. Melia et al. (2008) after there has been an accident" (reversed score). All organizational safety response items were rated on a five point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (5).
The second part of the survey utilized a ten-item group safety climate scale developed by Zohar (2000) . The scale measures supervisors' safety response. Example items are "Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work faster, rather than by the safe work procedures" (reverse scored), and "My immediate supervisor often talks to me about health and safety." All supervisors' safety response items were rated on a five point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (5).
Finally, coworkers' safety response was measured using five items adopted from Burt et al.'s considerate and responsible employee (CARE) scale (Burt et al. 1998) . Example items are "Coworkers should be warned when their actions are unsafe," and "Workers should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety." The remaining ten questions, which also measured coworkers' safety response, were adopted from the UK Health and Safety
Executive Safety Climate Survey (HSE 2002) . Example items are "My workmates encourage others to be safe" and "Some of my team pay little attention to health and safety" (reverse scored). All items were rated by respondents using a five point Likert scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree).
The dependent variable, i.e., injury frequency rate, was a combination of the workgroup lost time and medical treatment injury frequency rates for the twelve months prior to conducting the survey in each organization. This data was obtained from company records. Each individual respondent was assigned the injury frequency rate score for the workgroup in which they were situated. Study two was undertaken at a hospital construction project in Melbourne, Victoria.
Surveys were administered using the 'TurningPoint' automated response system with 'KeyPad' hand-held devices. The use of this system helps to overcome issues of literacy as survey questions are projected onto a screen and read out by the researcher. The response system can be set so that if a respondent presses an 'out of range' value (for example six), the response is not accepted. The researcher can monitor responses to determine completeness of data as it is being collected. The advantages of this system include the completeness of data and minimisation of human error in data entry (See de Quiros et al., 2008 for an analysis of the impact of human error in data entry).
Participants were invited, by the principal contractor's Site Safety Coordinator to participate in the survey during normal work hours. Surveys were completed in the site office.
Study three was undertaken at the Melbourne operations of a national steel reinforcement manufacturing organization. Data were collected from sixteen workgroups across four sites in metropolitan Melbourne. As in study two, surveys were administered using the 'TurningPoint' automated response system with 'KeyPad' hand-held devices. Workers unable to complete the initial survey were invited to complete a paper-based version of the questionnaire at a later date. Completed surveys were placed in self-sealed envelopes and returned directly to the research team, via the National Manager -Partnering.
Data analysis
Data were analysed using a principal components analysis with varimax rotation to determine the factor structure of the safety climate items. Internal consistency reliability of the safety climate components was then assessed using Cronbach's alpha. Bi-variate (Pearson) correlations were then performed to explore the relationships between the resulting safety climate factors and the injury frequency rate. In order to test whether group safety climate mediated the relationship between organizational safety climate and injury frequency rate, procedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986) were followed.
Baron and Kenny suggest that to test for mediation, three regression equations must be estimated as follows:
 the mediator (group safety climate) is regressed on the independent variable (organizational safety climate);
 the dependent variable (injury frequency rate) is regressed on the independent variable (organizational safety climate); and  the dependent variable (injury frequency rate) is regressed on both the independent variable (organizational safety climate) and the mediator (group safety climate).
To establish mediation, the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first equation; the independent variable must affect the dependent variable in the second equation; and the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third equation. If these conditions hold, then the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable in the third equation must be less in the third equation than in the second.
Results
The sample
A total of 400 surveys were received from the three organizations. One hundred and one Bivariate correlations Table 1 shows the bivariate correlations between each of the safety climate dimensions included in the analysis and the injury frequency rate of the workgroups from which respondents were drawn. As expected, there was a significant positive correlation between organizational and group-level safety climate. Perceptions of top management commitment to safety were strongly positively correlated with perceptions of supervisors' safety actions (r=.604, p=.000), supervisors' safety expectations (r=.492, p=.000), coworkers actual safety response (r=.539, p=.000) and coworkers' ideal safety response, (r=.207, p=.000). There was a significant inverse correlation between perceptions of top management's commitment to safety and the combined lost time/medical treatment injury rate (r=-.138, p=.043). Perceptions of supervisors' safety expectations were also inversely correlated with the lost time/medical treatment injury rate (r=-.272, p=.000).
4 A complete list of safety climate survey items and PCA results is available from the first author on request. 
Regression analysis
Prior to performing the regression analysis, relevant variables were screened to ensure that the assumptions normal distribution and equality of variance were not violated. The procedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986) were then followed to determine the extent to which the relationship between top management commitment to safety and workgroup injury frequency rate was mediated by perceptions of supervisors' safety expectations. 
Discussion
Cascading management influence
The results suggest that top managers have a significant influence on safety within organizations in the construction supply chain, but that this influence is indirect rather than direct. Perceptions of top managers' commitment to safety were strongly and positively correlated with perceptions of supervisors' safety actions and expectations as well as with perceptions of coworkers' ideal and actual safety. This suggests a cascading influence by which management commitment to safety filters down through organizational hierarchies. This finding is consistent with that of Melia et al. (2008) who report that perceptions of the organizational safety response and supervisor safety response were strongly correlated in two construction samples.
The results confirm the importance of the role of first-level supervisors in influencing group-level safety climates and the safety performance of the groups that they supervise.
The pathway by which management commitment to safety influences workgroup injury performance is through the development of shared perceptions of the safety expectations of their immediate supervisors within workgroups. Supervisors act as a "conduit" through which organizational safety priorities are communicated and provide important feedback to front-line workers concerning the appropriateness of their behavior (Niskanen 1994) .
The fact that the relationship between top management commitment to safety and workgroup injury frequency rates was fully mediated by perceptions of supervisors' safety expectations highlights the critical role played by supervisors in the safety management process. Without supervisors communicating high safety expectations, the influence of senior managers appears to be insignificant. This finding also demonstrates the importance of adopting a multi-level approach to the measurement and analysis of safety climate within construction organizations.
The influence of supervisors on safety performance is likely to be increased in the construction context because construction work is highly decentralized, with productive work undertaken at sites remote from the corporate office. This geographical dispersion is likely to increase the behavioral influence of supervisors relative to senior management. Construction work is also largely non-routine, necessitating the exercise of supervisory discretion in the interpretation of formal safety policies and procedures. In this context, the role of supervisors in shaping subordinates' safety behavior is likely to be considerably greater than in stable work contexts characterized by routine production processes.
In order to develop safety-supportive climates within workgroups, it is critical that supervisors are consistent in the way that they emphasise safety in their interactions with employees. Climates are formed on the basis of the day-to-day interactions and observations of supervisors' behavior. Over time, supervisors' behavior is observed to form a pattern. Positive and strong safety climates will develop only to the extent that supervisors are consistent in what they say and do in relation to safety. Thus, similar events or situations should elicit similar safety responses from supervisors reflecting stability in the importance placed upon safety. Where the supervisors' safety response is perceived by employees to be contingent upon the circumstances, for example if a supervisor changes his/her behavior when facing production pressure, the resulting group safety climate will be weak (Zohar & Luria 2004) .
Implications of the research
The findings have important implications for research as they highlight the need to evaluate multi-level models of safety climate in the construction industry. In particular, there is a need to better understand the mechanisms by which management commitment to safety 'cascades' down to lower tiers of management to ensure that supervisors' safety responses remain consistent with organizational safety commitments.
The findings also highlight the potential benefit of cross-level supervisory safety leadership interventions. For example, testing whether interventions designed to develop safety leadership behavior in supervisors can improve the safety performance of construction workgroups (Zohar & Luria, 2003) .
The research has important practical implications for the management of safety within organizations. They highlight the importance of first level supervisors in translating organizational safety policies and procedures into workgroup safety practices. As many first-level supervisors in the Australian construction industry, e.g. foremen and leading hands, have a trade background, most have not undertaken formal management education. Thus, there is potential to provide formal training to specifically develop leadership capability in first-level supervisors in relation to safety. The results suggest that this could yield significant dividends for construction organizations in terms of reduced lost time and medical treatment injuries.
Conclusions
The results reveal the import role played by first level supervisors as the linking mechanism between the organizational safety climate, specifically perceptions of top management commitment to safety, and injury rates within construction organizations.
The role played by group-level safety climate in mediating the relationship between organizational safety climate and safety performance highlights the importance of adopting a multi-level approach to the analysis of safety climate within construction organizations.
Limitations and future research
No attempt is made to generalize the results of the survey to the Australian construction industry. Participating companies were selected using a convenience sampling approach, constituting a significant threat to the external validity of the research. The research was also limited by the reliance upon reportable lost time and medical treatment injury rates as the measure of workgroup safety performance. The relative infrequency of these events could explain the failure to find a consistent and significant relationship between several of the safety climate dimensions and workgroup safety performance. Future research, using prospective designs and more sensitive measures of safety performance are recommended.
